Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 56 (2):275-287 (1989)
|Abstract||To infer the state of a cause from the states of its effects, independent lines of evidence are preferable to dependent ones. This familiar idea is here investigated, the goal being to identify its presuppositions. Connections are drawn with Reichenbach's (1956) and Salmon's (1984) discussions of the principle of the common cause|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Kent W. Staley (2004). Robust Evidence and Secure Evidence Claims. Philosophy of Science 71:467-488.
Elliott Sober (1984). Common Cause Explanation. Philosophy of Science 51 (2):212-241.
Elliott Sober (2009). Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence: Evidential Transitivity in Connection with Fossils, Fishing, Fine-Tuning, and Firing Squads. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (1):63 - 90.
Frank Arntzenius, Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Elliott Sober (2001). Venetian Sea Levels, British Bread Prices, and the Principle of the Common Cause. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):331-346.
Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese 179 (3):479 - 500.
Gábor Hofer‐Szabó (2002). Common‐Causes Are Not Common Common‐Causes. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):623-636.
Elliott Sober (1987). Parsimony, Likelihood, and the Principle of the Common Cause. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):465-469.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads5 ( #170,343 of 739,180 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,778 of 739,180 )
How can I increase my downloads?