Lies, Lies, and More Lies: A Plea for Propositions

Philosophical Studies 67 (1):51 - 69 (1992)
To resolve putative liar paradoxes it is sufficient to attend to the distinction between liar-sentences and the propositions they would express, and to exercise the option of turning would-be deductions of paradox (of contradictions) into reductions of the existence of those propositions. Defending the coherence of particular resolutions along these lines, leads to recognition of the non-extensionality of some liar-sentences. In particular, it turns out that exchanges of terms for identicals in the open-sentence '- does not expression a true proposition' are not invariably truth-preserving because they are not invariably proposition-expression preserving. All of this recommends propositions as fruitful subjects of interesting renewed research
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References found in this work BETA
R. M. Sainsbury (1995). Paradoxes. Cambridge University Press.
Charles Parsons (1974). The Liar Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.

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