David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:342 - 351 (1986)
It is shown that even if a process of ideal evidential deliberation that paid attention to its own progress would in every case lead to credences that made things probabilistically independent of actions of which they were believed to be causally independent; it would not in every case lead to agreement in the ultimate dictates of evidential and causal decision theories. This point is made by a decision problem in which the action prescribed by causal decision theory is not (as it is in Newcomb's Problem) a dominant action. It is also shown that such non-dominance problems provide decisive objections to Ratificationism.
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