David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 108 (1):11 - 61 (1996)
A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to Robinsonian hyperreals. Another appendix presents for comparison Newcomb's Problem and a problem in some ways like it suggested, I think, by ideas of John Calvin.
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard A. O. Williams (1973). Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press.
David Hume (1975). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. OUP Oxford.
Richard Holton (1994). Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
J. L. Mackie (1982). The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and Against the Existence of God. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Greg Janzen (2011). Pascal's Wager and the Nature of God. Sophia 50 (3):331-344.
Jordan Howard Sobel (1996). On the Significance of Conditional Probabilities. Synthese 109 (3):311 - 344.
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