Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 108 (1):11 - 61 (1996)
|Abstract||A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to Robinsonian hyperreals. Another appendix presents for comparison Newcomb's Problem and a problem in some ways like it suggested, I think, by ideas of John Calvin.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
T. Seidenfeld, M. J. Schervish & J. B. Kadane (1990). When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:517 - 524.
Jeff Jordan (2002). Pascal's Wagers. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 26 (1):213–223.
Ward E. Jones (2002). Explaining Our Own Beliefs: Non-Epistemic Believing and Doxastic Instability. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 111 (3):217 - 249.
Bas C. Van Fraassen (1983). Gentlemen's Wagers: Relevant Logic and Probability. Philosophical Studies 43 (1).
Javier de Lorenzo (1985). Pascal Y Los Indivisibles. Theoria 1 (1):87-120.
Bas C. Van Fraassen (1983). Gentlemen's Wagers: Relevant Logic and Probability. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):47 - 61.
C. Behan McCullagh (2007). Can Religious Beliefs Be Justified Pragmatically? Sophia 46 (1):21-34.
Robert Holyer (1989). Scepticism, Evidentialism and the Parity Argument: A Pascalian Perspective. Religious Studies 25 (2):191 - 208.
Kristin A. Wagers & Bruce Tonn (2011). Threats to Democratic Rationality. World Futures 66 (8):597-625.
Jeff Jordan (1998). Pascal's Wager Revisited. Religious Studies 34 (4):419-431.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #122,590 of 740,442 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,960 of 740,442 )
How can I increase my downloads?