David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 225-238 (2001)
Philosophy of mind is, and for a long while has been, 99% metaphysics and 1% epistemology. Attention is lavished on the question of the nature of mind, but questions concerning how we know about minds are discussed much less thoroughly. University courses in philosophy of mind routinely devote a lot of time to dualism, logical behaviourism, the mind/brain identity theory, and functionalism. But what gets said about the kinds of evidence that help one determine what mental states, if any, an individual occupies? Well, Skinner's puritanical disdain for postulating mental states gets raked over the coals, the problem of other minds gets solved by a perfunctory invocation of the principle of inference to the best explanation, and the Turing test gets discussed, mainly in order to emphasize that it can lead to mistaken answers
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Conservatism Ethnology Metaphysics Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Carolyn A. Ristau (1992). Cognitive Ethology: Past, Present and Speculations on the Future. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:125 - 136.
Matthew McGrath (2007). Memory and Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 157 (1):1 - 24.
W. H. Dittrich (forthcoming). Book Review of Allen & Bekoff (1997) on Cognitive Ethology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations.
Dale Jamieson & Marc Bekoff (1992). On Aims and Methods of Cognitive Ethology. Philosophy of Science Association 1992:110-124.
Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30-55.
Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Jeremy Koons (2005). Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification. Episteme 2 (3):203-218.
Michael Huemer (2011). Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads23 ( #116,841 of 1,700,306 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #362,609 of 1,700,306 )
How can I increase my downloads?