Towards an NPT-Restrained world that makes economic sense
| Abstract | Because most of the world's proliferators have used the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty's (NPT) call on nations to share the benefits of the applications of peaceful nuclear energy to help justify their nuclear activities, it is unclear just how much any proliferator ultimately has been restrained by these rules. This needs to change but is unlikely, unless the NPT's qualifications on the right to peaceful nuclear energy are read in a much more restrictive fashion to only authorize nuclear projects that are clearly beneficial economically and that truly can be safeguarded against diversion to make bombs. In this regard, our best hope is that, as nations consider how to prevent global warming, they might adopt clear economic guidelines that would compel all energy projects both nuclear and non-nuclear to compete economically against one another on a much more level playing field. This would make dangerous, uneconomical nuclear projects far less likely to be pursued, and a centering of the world's security on a proper reading of the NPT much more likely and sustainable. Indeed, unless economic discipline of this sort is attempted internationally, it is quite likely that the continued implementation of the current egregious view of the NPT will only serve to accelerate nuclear proliferation more rapidly than if there was no NPT at all. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,711 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesKristin Sharon Shrader-Frechette (2009). Data Trimming, Nuclear Emissions, and Climate Change. Science and Engineering Ethics 15 (1).
Thomas L. Perry (1989). Global Peace as a Professional Concern, I. Journal of Business Ethics 8 (2-3):167 - 171.
Henry Shue (ed.) (1989). Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint. Cambridge University Press.
Deborah G. Mayo (1983). An Objective Theory of Statistical Testing. Synthese 57 (3):297 - 340.
Gilles D. Hurteau (1989). Global Peace as a Professional Concern, II. Journal of Business Ethics 8 (2-3):173 - 175.
Deborah G. Mayo (1992). Did Pearson Reject the Neyman-Pearson Philosophy of Statistics? Synthese 90 (2):233 - 262.
Deborah G. Mayo (1982). On After-Trial Criticisms of Neyman-Pearson Theory of Statistics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:145 - 158.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads3 ( #202,139 of 551,054 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,341 of 551,054 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
