Asian Philosophy 8 (3):149 – 164 (1998)
|Abstract||We argue that the common attribution to Zhuangzi of both perspectivalism or relativism on the one hand, and scepticism on the other is fundamentally mistaken. While granting that it is reasonable to construe Zhuangzi as offering a perspectiva! position on judgement, we argue that Zhuangzi's perspectivalism does not commit him to a relativist position on truth or to scepticism about human knowledge. Rather, we maintain that Zhuangzi's attacks on the concepts of truth and knowledge are better seen as his articulation of a species of epistemological nihilism which rejects, as ultimately meaningless, the concepts of truth, reality, and knowledge.|
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