Legend naturalism and scientific progress: An essay on Philip Kitcher's the advancement of science

Abstract
Philip Kitcher's The Advancement of Science sets out, programmatically, a new naturalistic view of science as a process of building consensus practices. Detailed historical case studies--centrally, the Darwinian revolution--are intended to support this view. I argue that Kitcher's expositions in fact support a more conservative view, that I dub 'Legend Naturalism'. Using four historical examples which increasingly challenge Kitcher's discussions, I show that neither Legend Naturalism, nor the less conservative programmatic view, gives an adequate account of scientific progress. I argue for a naturalism that is more informed by psychology and a normative account that is both more social and less realist than the views articulated in The Advancement of Science.
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References found in this work BETA
David Gooding (1992). The Procedural Turn; or, Why Do Thought Experiments Work? In R. Giere & H. Feigl (eds.), Cognitive Models of Science. University of Minnesota Press. 45-76.
Philip Kitcher (1992). The Naturalists Return. Philosophical Review 101 (1):53-114.
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Stathis Psillos (1997). Kitcher on Reference. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (3):259 – 272.
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