David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Disputatio 3 (25):1-19 (2008)
In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of perceptions must be exhausted by the occurrence of inner sensory experiences that narrowly supervene on the perceiver. That is, empirical objects fail directly to determine the perceptual consciousness of the perceiver. The upshot is that not only naïve realism, but also certain further forms of direct realism have to be abandoned.
|Keywords||naïve realism disjunctivism hallucination perceptual consciousness causation|
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Sollberger (2012). Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.
Michael Sollberger (2013). In Defence of a Structural Account of Indirect Realism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
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