David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187 (2011)
Synesthetes are people who report having perceptual experiences that are very unusual, such as ?seeing? sounds as colors or ?smelling? colors as odors. It is commonly assumed these days that such synesthetic experiences must be instances of misperceptions. Against this widespread assumption, I will highlight that there is reason to think that at least some synesthetic experiences can be viewed as truly veridical perceptions, and not as illusions or hallucinations. On this view, which I will back up by conceptual arguments and empirical data, synesthesia does sometimes enable the individual to truly pick up on worldly features. In failing to take this possibility on board, the participants in this debate have thus unduly restricted the scope of dialectical options. Finally, the reassessment of synesthetic experiences that I defend in this paper will turn out to have important ramifications not just for synesthesia research, but also for perception theories more generally
|Keywords||Synesthesia Hallucination Veridical Perception|
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References found in this work BETA
Tim Crane (2001). Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
William C. Fish (2008). Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 144--167.
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Edward M. Hubbard (2001). Synaesthesia: A Window Into Perception, Thought and Language. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (12):3-34.
Peter G. Grossenbacher & Christopher T. Lovelace (2001). Mechanisms of Synesthesia: Cognitive and Physiological Constraints. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):36-41.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Sollberger (2014). Making Sense of an Endorsement Model of Thought‐Insertion. Mind and Language 29 (5):590-612.
Jennifer Matey (2013). You Can See What 'I' Means. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):57-70.
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