Subjectivity in heterophenomenology

I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon.
Keywords naïve phenomenology  Husserlian phenomenology  introspection  subjectivity  heterophenomenology
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-006-9032-0
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