David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212 (2010)
This paper develops a sympathetic critique of recent experimental work on free will and moral responsibility. Section 1 offers a brief defense of the relevance of experimental philosophy to the free will debate. Section 2 reviews a series of articles in the experimental literature that probe intuitions about the "compatibility question"—whether we can be free and morally responsible if determinism is true. Section 3 argues that these studies have produced valuable insights on the factors that influence our judgments on the compatibility question, but that their general approach suffers from significant practical and philosophical difficulties. Section 4 reviews experimental work addressing other aspects of the free will/moral responsibility debate, and section 5 concludes with a discussion of avenues for further research.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
Citations of this work BETA
Florian Cova, Amanda Garcia & Shen-yi Liao (2015). Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):927-939.
Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
James Andow & Florian Cova (forthcoming). Why Compatibilist Intuitions Are Not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology:1-17.
Joshua Shepherd (2015). Consciousness, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility: Taking the Folk Seriously. Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):929-946.
Adam Feltz & Florian Cova (2014). Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis. Consciousness and Cognition 30:234-246.
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