Does Blackburn's Expressivism Have a Problem with Respect to Supervenience? A Reply to Wright and Zangwill
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphysica 10 (1):89-95 (2008)
This paper is concerned with the expressivist account of moral supervenience that Simon Blackburn has offered. First, the account is presented, and an objection to it is thereafter discussed. In short, the objection is that the supervenience constraint in moral discourse is mysterious, given that no similar constraint governs speech and thought in other areas of discourse that seem to be prime candidates for an expressivist analysis. The conclusion of the paper is that this objection can be fended off.
|Keywords||Metaethics Expressivism Supervenience Extrinsic properties|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1984). Spreading the Word. Clarendon Press.
John Heil (1998). Supervenience Deconstructed. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):146-155.
Terence E. Horgan (1982). Supervenience and Microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):29-43.
James C. Klagge (1988). Supervenience: Ontological and Ascriptive. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (December):461-70.
David Lewis (1983). Extrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Nick Zangwill (1993). Supervenience and Anomalous Monism: Blackburn on Davidson. Philosophical Studies 71 (1):59-79.
Jorn Sonderholm (2005). Why an Expressivist Should Not Commit to Commitment-Semantics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):403–409.
Simon W. Blackburn (1984). Supervenience Revisited. In Ian Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge University Press. 59--74.
James Dreier (1992). The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):13-38.
Jordan Howard Sobel (2001). Blackburn's Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361 - 383.
Harold W. Noonan (1987). Supervenience. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (January):78-85.
Jordan Howard Sobel (2001). Blackburn's Problem: On its Not Insignificant Residue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):361-383.
Nick Zangwill (1995). Moral Supervenience. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):240-262.
Matthew Chrisman (2010). Expressivism, Inferentialism, and the Theory of Meaning. In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Jorn Sonderholm (2008). Why Supervenience is a Problem for Brink's Version of Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:203-213.
Nicholas Unwin (1999). Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (196):337-352.
Gerald K. Harrison (2013). The Moral Supervenience Thesis is Not a Conceptual Truth. Analysis 73 (1):62-68.
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Higher-Order Attitudes, Frege's Abyss, and the Truth in Propositions. In Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), (unknown). Oxford.
Matthew Chrisman (2009). Expressivism, Truth, and (Self-) Knowledge. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (3):1-26.
Added to index2010-09-13
Total downloads17 ( #96,904 of 1,100,727 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #289,271 of 1,100,727 )
How can I increase my downloads?