Graduate studies at Western
Metaphysica 12 (1):45-50 (2011)
|Abstract||Jeff Wisdom has recently defended the proposition that any view of moral supervenience worth its salt must incorporate a diachronic view of base property exemplification. Let us call the proposition defended by Wisdom p. In this paper, I try to show that Wisdom has offered no good reasons for accepting p. My argumentative strategy proceeds along two separate tracks. First, I try to show that the thought experiment Wisdom employs in order to underwrite p does not offer the intended support for the proposition. Secondly, I try to show that even if the problems with the thought experiment in question are ignored, there is at least one other reason for thinking that Wisdom has not offered a convincing argument in favor of p|
|Keywords||Moral supervenience Base property exemplification Global supervenience|
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