Exaggerating the Importance of Diachronic Base Property Exemplification in Moral Supervenience

Metaphysica 12 (1):45-50 (2011)
Abstract
Jeff Wisdom has recently defended the proposition that any view of moral supervenience worth its salt must incorporate a diachronic view of base property exemplification. Let us call the proposition defended by Wisdom p. In this paper, I try to show that Wisdom has offered no good reasons for accepting p. My argumentative strategy proceeds along two separate tracks. First, I try to show that the thought experiment Wisdom employs in order to underwrite p does not offer the intended support for the proposition. Secondly, I try to show that even if the problems with the thought experiment in question are ignored, there is at least one other reason for thinking that Wisdom has not offered a convincing argument in favor of p
Keywords Moral supervenience  Base property exemplification  Global supervenience
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1987). 'Strong' and 'Global' Supervenience Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):315-26.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1995). Varieties of Supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. 16--59.

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