Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive by
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264 (2007)
| Abstract | Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved (the addressee, the general audience, bystanders, etc.). Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion : lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of our disapproval of non-deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion. | |||||||||
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