David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):28-43 (2000)
Positive thinkers love Watty Piper's The little engine that could. The story features a train laden with toys for deserving children on the other side of the mountain. After the locomotive breaks down, a sequence of snooty locomotives come up the track. Each engine refuses to pull the train up the mountain. They are followed by a weary old locomotive that declines, saying "I cannot. I cannot. I cannot." But then a bright blue engine comes up the track. He manages to chug over the mountain by averring "I think I can. I think I can. I think can.".
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References found in this work BETA
Jaakko Hintikka (1962). Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
Leonard Linsky (1968). On Interpreting Doxastic Logic. Journal of Philosophy 65 (17):500-502.
D. C. Makinson (1965). ``The Paradox of the Preface&Quot. Analysis 25:205-207.
Sydney Shoemaker (1995). Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.
Citations of this work BETA
John N. Williams (2006). Moore's Paradox and Conscious Belief. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.
Peter Pagin (2008). Informativeness and Moore's Paradox. Analysis 68 (1):46 - 57.
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