Bald-faced lies! Lying without the intent to deceive by

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):251-264 (2007)
Surprisingly, the fact that the speaker is lying is sometimes common knowledge between everyone involved (the addressee, the general audience, bystanders, etc.). Strangely, we condemn these bald-faced lies more severely than disguised lies. The wrongness of lying springs from the intent to deceive – just the feature missing in the case of bald-faced lies. These puzzling lies arise systematically when assertions are forced. Intellectual duress helps to explain another type of non-deceptive false assertion : lying to yourself. In the end, I conclude that the apparent intensity of our disapproval of non-deceptive lies is a rhetorical illusion.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,804
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
R. Sorensen (2010). Knowledge-Lies. Analysis 70 (4):608-615.
Tim Kenyon (2010). Assertion and Capitulation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):352-368.

View all 9 citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

109 ( #18,176 of 1,707,713 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

11 ( #58,584 of 1,707,713 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.