Précis of vagueness and contradiction [Book Review]

Rorty goes on to connect the sorites paradox to analytic philosophy’s long standing concern with the correspondence theory of truth. How do our words hook up with reality? Do our categories map pre-existing contours? The nominalist answers that “facts” are just projections of our forms of speech. Rorty characterizes epistemicism as a hyper-realist backlash. In addition to thinking that our scientific terminology cuts nature at the joint, the epistemicist asserts that even the vague vocabulary of common sense has sharp thresholds.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Susanne Bobzien (2002). Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238.
    Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Patrick Greenough (2011). Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.
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