Sharp edges from Hedges: Fatalism, vagueness and epistemic possibility

Philosophical Studies 131 (3):607 - 626 (2006)
Mights plug gaps. If p lacks a truth-value, then ‘It might be that p’ should also lack truth-value. Yet epistemic hedges often turn an unassertible statement into an assertible one. The phenomenon is illustrated in detail for two kinds of statements that are frequently alleged to be counterexamples to the principle of bivalence: future contingents and statements that apply predicates to borderline cases. The paper concludes by exploring the prospects for generalizing this gap-plugging strategy.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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References found in this work BETA
Jaakko Hintikka (1962). Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca, N.Y.,Cornell University Press.
Keith DeRose (1991). Epistemic Possibilities. Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.

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Roy Sorensen (2005). A Reply to Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):712-728.

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