Sharp edges from Hedges: Fatalism, vagueness and epistemic possibility

Philosophical Studies 131 (3):607 - 626 (2006)
Abstract
Mights plug gaps. If p lacks a truth-value, then ‘It might be that p’ should also lack truth-value. Yet epistemic hedges often turn an unassertible statement into an assertible one. The phenomenon is illustrated in detail for two kinds of statements that are frequently alleged to be counterexamples to the principle of bivalence: future contingents and statements that apply predicates to borderline cases. The paper concludes by exploring the prospects for generalizing this gap-plugging strategy.
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References found in this work BETA
C. Anthony Anderson (1983). The Paradox of the Knower. Journal of Philosophy 80 (6):338-355.
Keith DeRose (1991). Epistemic Possibilities. Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
Ian Hacking (1967). Possibility. Philosophical Review 76 (2):143-168.

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Citations of this work BETA
Roy Sorensen (2005). A Reply to Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):712–728.
Roy Sorensen (2005). A Reply to Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):712-728.
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