Dubious assertions

Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272 (2009)
The knowledge account of assertion—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—aspires to identify the norm distinctive of assertion. One main argument given in support of the knowledge account has been the success with which it explains a variety of Moore-paradoxical assertion. But that explanation does not generalize satisfactorily.
Keywords Norms of assertion  Knowledge account  Moore’s paradox
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DOI 10.2307/27734516
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

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Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Greco (2014). Iteration and Fragmentation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):n/a-n/a.

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