Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272 (2009)
|Abstract||The knowledge account of assertion—roughly: one should not assert what one does not know—aspires to identify the norm distinctive of assertion. One main argument given in support of the knowledge account has been the success with which it explains a variety of Moore-paradoxical assertion. But that explanation does not generalize satisfactorily.|
|Keywords||Norms of assertion Knowledge account Moore’s paradox|
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