Epistemology, realism, and truth: The first philosophical perspectives lecture

Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1):1-16 (1993)
Truth centered epistemology puts truth at the center in more ways than one. For one thing, it makes truth a main cognitive goal of inquiry. For another, it explains other main epistemic concepts in terms of truth. Knowledge itself, for example, is explained as belief that meets certain other conditions, among them being true. And a belief is said to be rationally or epistemically justified or apt, which it must be in order to be knowledge, only if it derives from a truth-conducive faculty, an intellectual virtue. What defensible theories of truth are open to such truth-centered epistemology? That is our main question.
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DOI 10.2307/2214114
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Jamin Asay (2013). Primitive Truth. Dialectica 67 (4):503-519.

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