Fregean reference defended
Philosophical Issues 6:91-99 (1995)
| Abstract | What is involved in acquiring a russellian proposition (x, φ) as content of an attitude: what does it take for one to acquire such an attitude de re? How do we gain access to x itself so as to be able to have (x, φ) as content of our thought? | |||||||||
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