David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Linda Zagzebski (ed.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press,. 49--62 (2000)
“Rational beings pursue and value truth (the true, along with the good and the beautiful). Intellectual conduct is to be judged, accordingly, by how well it aids our pursuit of that ideal.” What does this mean, and is it true? Even if intelligent life had never evolved or otherwise existed, Venus would still have orbited the Sun, so it would still have been true that Venus orbited the Sun. It is not the being thus true of what is true that we value indiscriminately. Some truths are good, but not all, far from it. In loving the truth, then, what we value is not the being true of the truths. What we value in pursuing truth is rather our grasping it, our having it. What does this mean? Only through believing it does one relevantly have a truth: we have the truth that snow is white by believing that snow is white. In pursuing the truth what we want is (at least) true beliefs. Suppose you enter your dentist’s waiting room and find all the magazines taken. Deprived of reading matter, you’re sure to doze off, but you need no sleep. Are you then rationally bound to reach for the telephone book in pursuit of truth? Were you not to do so, you would forfeit a chance to pluck some desired goods within easy reach. If random telephone numbers do not elicit a wide enough yawn, consider a randomly selected cubic foot of the Sahara. Here is a trove of facts, of the form grain x is so many millimeters in direction D from grain y, than which few can be of less interest. Or take some bit of trivia known to me at the moment: say, that it was sunny in Rhode Island at noon on October 21, 1999. I confess that I will not rue my loss of this information, nor do I care either that or how early it will be gone. As interpreted so far, the view that we rationally want truth as such reduces to absurdity, or is at best problematic. What then is it we want in pursuing truth? If it is not after all true beliefs indiscriminately, what then is it? A manageable number of true beliefs? Obviously not; it is not just a matter of numbers..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter (2013). A Problem for Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis 78 (2):253-275.
Dennis Whitcomb (2010). Curiosity Was Framed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.
Anandi Hattiangadi (2010). The Love of Truth. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
Christian Piller (2009). Valuing Knowledge: A Deontological Approach. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):413 - 428.
J. Carter (2011). Kvanvig on Pointless Truths and the Cognitive Ideal. Acta Analytica 26 (3):285-293.
Similar books and articles
Diego Marconi (2006). On the Mind Dependence of Truth. Erkenntnis 65 (3):301 - 318.
James R. Beebe, Prosentential Theory of Truth. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ernest Sosa (2000). &Quot;for the Love of Truth?&Quot;. In Linda Zagzebski & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 49-62.
Charles Sayward (1987). Prior’s Theory of Truth. Analysis 47 (2):83-87.
Susan Haack (2008). The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):20-35.
Matthew McGrath (1997). Weak Deflationism. Mind 106 (421):69-98.
Daniel Stoljar, The Deflationary Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Nikolaj Jang Linding Pedersen (2006). What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? The Monist 89 (1):102-117.
Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2006). What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? The Monist 89 (1):103-117.
Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Clarendon Press.
Added to index2009-02-07
Total downloads134 ( #6,604 of 1,102,935 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #29,681 of 1,102,935 )
How can I increase my downloads?