David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 142 (1):5 - 15 (2009)
Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate), a second level if competent (or adroit), and a third if true because competent (or apt). Knowledge on one level (the animal level) is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of epistemic normativity as does belief itself, yet to suspend is of course precisely not to perform, certainly not with the aim of truth. The paper takes up this problem, and proposes a solution that distinguishes levels of performance norrmativity, including a first order where execution competence is in play, and a second order where the performer must assess the risks attendant on issuing a first-order performance. This imports a level of reflective knowledge that ascends above the animal level.
|Keywords||Animal knowledge Reflective knowledge Aptness Epistemic normativity Epistemic value|
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Cheng-Hung Tsai (2011). The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.
John Turri (2013). Knowledge Guaranteed. Noûs 47 (3):602-612.
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2014). The Structure of Practical Expertise. Philosophia 42 (2):539-554.
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