Ontology, understanding, and the a priori

Ratio 16 (2):178–188 (2003)
How might one explain the reliability of one's a priori beliefs? What if anything is implied about the ontology of a certain realm of knowledge by the possibility of explaining one's reliability about that realm? Very little, or so it is argued here.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00214
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