Propositional knowledge

Philosophical Studies 20 (3):33 - 43 (1969)
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Abstract

The received definition of knowledge (as true, evident belief) has recently been questioned by Edmund Gettier with an example whose principle is as follows. A proposition, p, is both evident to and accepted by someone S, who sees that its truth entails (would entail) (that either p is true or q is true). This last is thereby made evident to him, and he accepts it, but it happens to be true only because q is true, since p is in fact false. Hence, inasmuch as he has no evidence for the proposition q, S can hardly be said to know (that either p is true or q is true). Here then is a formula for true, evident beliefs that are not cases of knowledge. I discuss the possibility of adding a fourth condition to this triad.

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Ernest Sosa
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
More on knowledge before Gettier.Pierre Le Morvan - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-9.
Epistemic Value and Fortuitous Truth.Colin Cheyne - 1997 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (1):109–134.

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References found in this work

Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1948 - London and New York: Routledge.
A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.
Knowledge, Truth and Evidence.Keith Lehrer - 1965 - Analysis 25 (5):168 - 175.
Knowledge, truth and evidence.Keith Lehrer - 1965 - Analysis 25 (5):168.

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