Relevant alternatives, contextualism included

Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):35-65 (2004)
Since this paper is for a conference on “Contextualism in Epistemology and Beyond,” I have opted to sketch a retrospective of contextualism in epistemology, including highlights of the “relevant alternatives” approach, given how relevantism and contextualism have developed in tandem. We focus on externalist forms of contextualism, bypassing internalist forms such as Cohen 1988 and Lewis 1996, but much of our discussion will be applicable to contextualism generally. Internalist contextualism is helpfully discussed in papers by Stewart Cohen, Richard Feldman, and Jonathan Vogel, in Tomberlin 1999.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000029349.75799.17
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Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2005). Resurrecting the Tracking Theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
Peter Baumann (2008). Contextualism and the Factivity Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580–602.

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