Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162 (1996)
|Abstract||A discussion of George Bealer's conception and defense of rational intuition as a basis of philosophical knowledge, under three main heads: a) the phenomenology of intellectual intuition; b) the status of such intuition as a basic source of evidence, and the explanation of what gives it that status; and c) the defense of intuition against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle from the set of valid sources of evidence.|
|Keywords||Epistemology, Intuition, Knowledge, Philosophy, Rationality|
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