Rational intuition: Bealer on its nature and epistemic status

Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):151--162 (1996)
A discussion of George Bealer's conception and defense of rational intuition as a basis of philosophical knowledge, under three main heads: a) the phenomenology of intellectual intuition; b) the status of such intuition as a basic source of evidence, and the explanation of what gives it that status; and c) the defense of intuition against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle from the set of valid sources of evidence.
Keywords Epistemology, Intuition, Knowledge, Philosophy, Rationality
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372779
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Moti Mizrahi (2014). Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
Jennifer Nado (2013). Why Intuition? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):15-41.

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