Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):410-430 (1997)
|Abstract||According to Moore, his argument meets three conditions for being a proof: first, the premiss is different from the conclusion; second, he knows the premiss to be the case; and, third, the conclusion follows deductively.2 Further conditions may be required, but he evidently thinks his proof would satisfy these as well. As Moore is well aware, many philosophers will feel he has not given “...any satisfactory proof of the point in question."3 Some, he believes, will want the premiss itself proved. But he has..|
|Keywords||epistemology, knowledge, moore, proof, reflexivity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Annalisa Coliva (2008). The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.
John N. Williams (2004). Moore's Paradoxes, Evans's Principle and Self-Knowledge. Analysis 64 (284):348-353.
Norman Malcolm (1977). Thought and Knowledge: Essays. Cornell University Press.
Ernest Sosa (2009). Responses to Nuccetelli, Lemos, and Bueno. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):203-213.
Susana Nuccetelli (2009). Sosa's Moore and the New Dogmatists. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):180-186.
John Greco (2002). How to Reid Moore. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):544-563.
Charles Landesman (1999). Moore's Proof of an External World and the Problem of Skepticism. Journal of Philosophical Research 24:21-36.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #20,276 of 722,919 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #12,335 of 722,919 )
How can I increase my downloads?