Reflective knowledge in the best circles

Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):410-430 (1997)
According to Moore, his argument meets three conditions for being a proof: first, the premiss is different from the conclusion; second, he knows the premiss to be the case; and, third, the conclusion follows deductively.2 Further conditions may be required, but he evidently thinks his proof would satisfy these as well. As Moore is well aware, many philosophers will feel he has not given “...any satisfactory proof of the point in question."3 Some, he believes, will want the premiss itself proved. But he has..
Keywords epistemology, knowledge, moore, proof, reflexivity
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DOI jphil199794827
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Jeremy Fantl (2008). Knowing-How and Knowing-That. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
Stewart Cohen (2005). Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):417 - 430.

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