Replies to commentators on a virtue epistemology (oxford university press, 2007)

Philosophical Studies 144 (1):137--147 (2009)
Abstract Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
Keywords Virtue epistemology  Dreams  Knowledge  Skepticism  Apt belief  Animal knowledge  Reflective knowledge
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DOI 10.2307/27734434
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Moti Mizrahi (2014). Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.

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Similar books and articles
Paul Crittenden (2002). On Virtue Ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):114 – 116.
Hilary Kornblith (2009). Sosa in Perspective. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):127--136.
Stephen R. Grimm (2009). Epistemic Normativity. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 243-264.

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