Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on reflective knowledge (OUP, 2009)

Philosophical Studies 153 (1):43-59 (2011)
Replies to Ram Neta, James Van Cleve, and Crispin Wright for a book symposium on Reflective Knowledge (OUP, 2009).
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Philosophy of Mind   Ethics
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References found in this work BETA
Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
Jonathan Vogel (2000). Reliabilism Leveled. Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
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Similar books and articles
Ram Neta (2011). Reflections on Reflective Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):3 - 17.
James van Cleve (2003). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):219–227.
James Van Cleve (2003). Review: Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):219 - 227.
Crispin Wright (2012). Replies. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press. 201-219.
Ram Neta (2007). Anti-Intellectualism and the Knowledge-Action Principle. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180–187.

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