Dialectica 53 (3-4):227-41 (1999)
|Abstract||This paper tries to clarify the nature of philosophical questions as to the ontological nature of things, especially persons. It considers implications of an Aristotelian account, which leads to an ontology that makes subjects and other things epistemologically remote. This makes the account doubtfully reconcilable with the special epistemic relation that each of us has to oneself, via for example the cogito.|
|Keywords||Body Essentialism Metaphysics Person Property Supervenience|
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