The Disjunctive Theory of Perception

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition) (2009)
Perceptual experiences are often divided into the following three broad categories: veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. For example, when one has a visual experience as of a red object, it may be that one is really seeing an object and its red colour (veridical perception), that one is seeing a green object (illusion), or that one is not seeing an object at all (hallucination). Many maintain that the same account should be given of the nature of the conscious experience that occurs in each of these three cases. Those who hold a disjunctive theory of perception deny this. Disjunctivists typically reject the claim that the same kind of experience is common to all three cases because they hold views about the nature of veridical perception that are inconsistent with it.
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Mattia Riccardi (forthcoming). Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-12.

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