David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):472-492 (2008)
In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justified nor unjustified—but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgements about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting. While the account concedes that when one recollects one's attitude to what is recollected cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time-travel—a case of re-visiting, or re-acquaintance with, some past episode.
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Ryle (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
William James (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
David Velleman (2000). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press.
Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Soteriou (2007). Content and the Stream of Consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):543–568.
D. Perrin & S. Rousset (2014). The Episodicity of Memory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):291-312.
Robert Hopkins (2014). Episodic Memory as Representing the Past to Oneself. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):313-331.
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