David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 120 (479):761-802 (2011)
Commonsense suggests that moral judgements and conventional normative judgements are importantly different in kind. Yet a compelling vindicating account of the moral/conventional distinction has proven persistently elusive. The distinction is typically explicated in terms of either formal properties (the Form View) or substantive properties (the Content View) of the principles that figure in the judgements. But the most promising versions of these views face serious difficulties. After reviewing the difficulties with the standard accounts, I propose a new way of explicating the moral/conventional distinction in terms of the role that social practices play in grounding the judgements (the Grounds View)
|Keywords||moral/conventional distinction morality convention normativity moral judgement Grounds View Form View Content View social practice|
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References found in this work BETA
Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455):509-563.
David Owens (2006). A Simple Theory of Promising. Philosophical Review 115 (1):51-77.
Edward B. Royzman, Robert F. Leeman & Jonathan Baron (2009). Unsentimental Ethics: Towards a Content-Specific Account of the Moral–Conventional Distinction. Cognition 112 (1):159-174.
Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Clipsham (2014). Does Empirical Moral Psychology Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Studies 170 (2):215-233.
Lubomira Radoilska (2014). Immigration, Interpersonal Trust and National Culture. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17 (1):111-128.
George Letsas (2014). The DNA of Conventions. Law and Philosophy 33 (5):535-571.
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