Husserls idee einer nicht-empirischen wissenschaft Von der lebenswelt

Husserl Studies 26 (1):49-66 (2010)
Abstract
Commonly overlooked in the commentaries on Husserl’s conception of the lifeworld is the fact that Husserl conceived his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science with an empirical as well as a non-empirical (eidetic) stage. At the lower stage, it deals with our factical lifeworld and aims at general propositions about the very world we live in. At the higher stage, i.e., the primary stage for Husserl, it aims at general propositions about the lifeworld as such but not about our factical lifeworld, which now serves only as one possible lifeworld among others. This higher-level science of the lifeworld is a descriptive eidetics made up of pure descriptive concepts and pure descriptive laws (descriptive eidetic laws), in which no factical entity is posited explicitly or implicitly. The present paper analyzes these relationships. In an excursus, it also traces out the elements, principles and methodology of a descriptive eidetics in general to see how they are applied to Husserl’s descriptive eidetics of the lifeworld as it is subsequently developed in his lectures on Phenomenological Psychology from 1925, a text in which Husserl explicitly outlines his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science.
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