David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140 (2010)
Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition.
|Keywords||embodied cognition mindreading theory of mind|
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References found in this work BETA
Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
George Lakoff & Mark Johnson (1999). Philosophy in the Flesh the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought.
Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford University Press.
Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.
A. Goldman (2006/2008). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Dan Zahavi (2011). Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.
Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
Shannon Spaulding (2015). On Whether We Can See Intentions. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
Shannon Spaulding (2015). On Direct Social Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
Shaun Gallagher & Somogy Varga (2014). Social Constraints on the Direct Perception of Emotions and Intentions. Topoi 33 (1):185-199.
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