Embodied cognition and mindreading

Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140 (2010)
Abstract
Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition.
Keywords embodied cognition  mindreading  theory of mind
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References found in this work BETA
Martin Davies (2000). Persons and Their Underpinnings. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62.

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Citations of this work BETA
Joel Krueger (2012). Seeing Mind in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
Joshua Shepherd (2012). Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.
Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.

View all 20 citations

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