David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 189 (3):515-534 (2012)
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate. The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in the Simulation Theory (ST) of mindreading. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over Theory Theory (TT). In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for the ST of mindreading. My view is that on an appropriate construal of their function, mirror neurons do not operate like simulation theorists claim. In fact, mirror neurons are more appropriately understood as one element in an information-rich mindreading process. As such, mirror neurons fit in better with some sort of TT account of mindreading. I offer a positive account, the Model TT, which better explains the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.
|Keywords||Social cognition Simulation theory Mindreading Theory of mind Mirror neurons|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan M. Leslie & Uta Frith (1985). Does the Autistic Child Have a “Theory of Mind”? Cognition 21 (1):37-46.
Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.) (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Justin C. Fisher (2006). Does Simulation Theory Really Involve Simulation? Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.
Vittorio Gallese (2007). Before and Below 'Theory of Mind': Embodied Simulation and the Neural Correlates of Social Cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):659-669.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Emma Borg (2007). If Mirror Neurons Are the Answer, What Was the Question? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (8):5-19.
Shannon Spaulding (2013). Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition. Mind and Language 28 (2):233-257.
Lawrence Shapiro (2009). Making Sense of Mirror Neurons. Synthese 167 (3):439 - 456.
Mitchell Herschbach (2012). Mirroring Versus Simulation: On the Representational Function of Simulation. Synthese 189 (3):483-513.
Luca Barlassina (2013). Simulation is Not Enough: A Hybrid Model of Disgust Attribution on the Basis of Visual Stimuli. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.
Dr John R. Skoyles (2008). Why Our Brains Cherish Humanity: Mirror Neurons and Colamus Humanitatem. Cogprints.
Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.
Dieter Lohmar (2006). Mirror Neurons and the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):5-16.
John Michael (2011). Four Models of the Functional Contribution of Mirror Systems. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):185 - 194.
Alvin I. Goldman & Chandra S. Sripada (2005). Simulationist Models of Face-Based Emotion Recognition. Cognition 94 (3):193-213.
Added to index2012-05-22
Total downloads35 ( #46,507 of 1,096,320 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #10,737 of 1,096,320 )
How can I increase my downloads?