Journal of the History of Philosophy 18 (1):9-22 (1980)
|Abstract||A textual and philosophical study of the claim that according to ockham there is no synonymy or equivocation in mental language. It is argued that ockham is committed to both claims, Either explicitly or in virtue of other features of his doctrine. Nevertheless, Both claims lead to difficulties for ockham's theory|
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