Attention and intentionalism

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342 (2010)
Abstract
Many alleged counter-examples to intentionalism, the thesis that the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of a given sense modality supervenes on the contents of experiences of that modality, can be avoided by adopting a liberal view of the sorts of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. I argue that there is a class of counter-examples to intentionalism, based on shifts in attention, which avoids this response. A necessary connection between the contents and phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences can be preserved by distinguishing perceptual phenomenology from the phenomenology of attention; but even if this distinction is viable, these cases put pressure on the thesis that phenomenal character can, in general, be explained in terms of mental representation.
Keywords attention   intentionalism   representationalism
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Citations of this work BETA
Wayne Wu (2011). What is Conscious Attention? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):93-120.
Thomas Crowther (2010). The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.

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