A quick argument against phenomenism, Fregeanism, appearance property-ism and (maybe) functionalism about perceptual content
|Abstract||A short paper which is pretty much what its title says it is.|
|Keywords||perception appearance properties intentionalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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