Epistemic two-dimensionalism and the epistemic argument

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):59 – 78 (2010)
Abstract
One of Kripke's fundamental objections to descriptivism was that the theory misclassifies certain _a posteriori_ propositions expressed by sentences involving names as _a priori_. Though nowadays very few philosophers would endorse a descriptivism of the sort that Kripke criticized, many find two-dimensional semantics attractive as a kind of successor theory. Because two-dimensionalism needn't be a form of descriptivism, it is not open to the epistemic argument as formulated by Kripke; but the most promising versions of two-dimensionalism are open to a close relative of that argument
Keywords two-dimensionalism  Chalmers  epistemic argument
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