Epistemic Vigilance

Mind and Language 25 (4):359-393 (2010)
Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x
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Helen De Cruz (2015). Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.
Hugo Mercier (2011). Self-Deception: Adaptation or by-Product? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):35-35.

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