David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Faith and Philosophy 16 (2):239-247 (1999)
In a recent exchange, John M. Fischer and David Widerker have debated whether or not it is appropriate to employ Frankfurt-style examples in efforts to challenge the intuitively plausible “principle of alternative possibilities.” Most recently, David Widerker and Charlotte Katzoff have tried to defend Widerker’s initial claim that such examples beg the question against libertarianism. As a libertarian sympathizer, I would like very much for these arguments to go through. However, I argue here that (1) their “molinist” critique is off-target, (2) their demonstration of the general falsity of Fischer’s libertarianism misses the point, and (3) they infer the relevance of alternative possibilities from the mere existence of such alternatives in a way that requires unprovided justification
|Keywords||Avoidability Possibility Religion Fischer, J Katzoff, C Widerker, D|
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