Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282 (2011)
| Abstract | Millians sometimes claim that we can explain the fact that sentences like "If Hesperus exists, then Hesperus is Phosphorus" seem a posteriori to speakers in terms of the fact that utterances of sentences of this sort would typically pragmatically convey propositions which really are a posteriori. I argue that this kind of pragmatic explanation of the seeming a posterioricity of sentences of this sort fails. The main reason is that for every sentence like the above which (by Millian lights) is a priori, seems a posteriori to most speakers, and would typically be used to convey a posteriori propositions, there is another which (again, by Millian lights) is a priori, seems a posteriori to most speakers, but can only typically be used to convey a priori propositions. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Frege's puzzle Millianism | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesRod Bertolet (1994). Conventions and Coreferentiality. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:257-262.
Richard Swinburne (1991). Necessary a Posteriori Truth. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):113 - 123.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2011). A Priori and A Posteriori: A Bootstrapping Relationship. Metaphysica 12 (2):151-164.
Ben Caplan (2007). Millian Descriptivism. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):181-198.
Kai-Yee Wong (1996). Singular Propositions and the A Priori. Journal of Philosophical Research 21:107-116.
Philip Atkins (2013). A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
Jeff Speaks (2010). Millian Descriptivism Defended. Philosophical Studies 149 (2).
Hagit Benbaji (2008). Two-Dimensionalism and the “Knowing Which” Requirement. Acta Analytica 23 (1):55-67.
M. A. Moffett (2002). A Note on the Relationship Between Mates' Puzzle and Frege's Puzzle. Journal of Semantics 19 (2):159-166.
Stavroula Glezakos (2009). Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle? In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-12-09Total downloads83 ( #9,324 of 556,898 )Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #9,676 of 556,898 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
