Facts, properties, and the nature of the proposition
| Abstract | I argue that the best way to solve Russell's problem of the relationship between propositions and their constituents is to think of propositions as properties of worlds. I argue that this view preserves the strengths and avoids some of the weaknesses of the view of the metaphysics of propositions defended by Jeff King in his _The Nature and Structure of Content_, and that it provides an explanation of the representational properties of propositions and the nature of indexical belief. I conclude by discussing some problems about how to think about the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, if a view of this sort is correct. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Russell unity of the proposition | |||||||||
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Jeffrey C. King (2007). What in the World Are the Ways Things Might Have Been? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 133 (3):443 - 453.
Richard Gaskin (1997). Russell and Richard Brinkley on the Unity of the Proposition. History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):139-150.
Graham Stevens (2006). Russell's Repsychologising of the Proposition. Synthese 151 (1):99 - 124.
Philip L. Peterson (2000). Fact-, Proposition-, and Event-Individuation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:29-36.
Jan Almäng (2012). Russellian Propositions and Properties. Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.
Howard Peacock (2011). Is There a Problem About Propositional Unity? Dialectica 65 (3):393-418.
Graham Stevens (2008). Russell and the Unity of the Proposition. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):491–506.
Jeffrey C. King (2007). The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford University Press.
Anssi Korhonen (2009). Russell's Early Metaphysics of Propositions. Prolegomena 8 (2):159-192.
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