Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):109-117 (2002)
|Abstract||Jerry Fodor argues, in The mind doesn't work that way (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, that the computational theory of mind is undermined by the pervasive context sensitivity of human cognition. His objections can be easily met, however, by noting the properties of appropriately structured representation hierarchies|
|Keywords||Cognition Computation Hierarchy Mind Science Fodor, J|
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