Hierarchy helps it work that way
Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):109-117 (2002)
| Abstract | Jerry Fodor argues, in The mind doesn't work that way (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, that the computational theory of mind is undermined by the pervasive context sensitivity of human cognition. His objections can be easily met, however, by noting the properties of appropriately structured representation hierarchies | |||||||||
| Keywords | Cognition Computation Hierarchy Mind Science Fodor, J | |||||||||
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Daniel A. Weiskopf (2002). On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
Robert A. Wilson (2005). What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp 30:407-425.
Steven Pinker (2005). So How Does the Mind Work? Mind and Language 20 (1):1-38.
Robert A. Wilson (2008). What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind.
Susan Schneider (2007). Yes, It Does: A Diatribe on Jerry Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Psyche.
Jerry A. Fodor (2003). Hume Variations. Oxford University Press.
Kirk Ludwig & Susan Schneider (2008). Fodor's Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind. Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143.
Jay L. Garfield (1997). Mentalese Not Spoken Here: Computation, Cognition, and Causation. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):413-35.
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