Is mental content prior to linguistic meaning?: Stalnaker on intentionality

Noûs 40 (3):428-467 (2006)
Abstract
Since the 1960's, work in the analytic tradition on the nature of mental and linguistic content has converged on the views that social facts about public language meaning are derived from facts about the thoughts of individuals, and that these thoughts are constituted by properties of the internal states of agents. I give a two-part argument against this picture of intentionality: first, that if mental content is prior to public language meaning, then a view of mental content much like the causal-pragmatic theory presented by Robert Stalnaker in Inquiry must be correct; second, that the causal-pragmatic theory is false. I conclude with some positive suggestions regarding alternative solutions to the `problem of intentionality.'.
Keywords Stalnaker  intentionality  indication  mental content
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1986). Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind. Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jason Stanley (2010). &Quot;assertion" and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87 - 113.
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Richard E. Aquila (1989). Intentionality, Content, and Primitive Mental Directedness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):583-604.
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