Is there a problem of the essential indexical?
| Abstract | Some time ago, John Perry argued that the content of an indexical belief, that is, a belief expressible with a sentence containing an indexical or demonstrative, cannot be a proposition. I consider several of his arguments for this view, and show that they can be extended to show that belief expressible with other non-indexical expressions such as natural kind terms and proper names presents the very same problem for the traditional picture. I then suggest that if indexical belief has any special status, this is not because it has a special kind of content, but rather because action is impossible if agents do not have indexical belief. | |||||||||
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James Dreier (2009). Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):79-110.
John Perry (1993). The Problem of the Essential Indexical: And Other Essays. Oxford University Press.
Gillian Russell (2011). Indexicals, Context-Sensitivity and the Failure of Implication. Synthese 183 (2):143-160.
Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
Desheng Zong (2011). Retention of Indexical Belief and the Notion of Psychological Continuity. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):608-623.
Moritz Schulz (2010). The Dynamics of Indexical Belief. Erkenntnis 72 (3).
John Perry (1979). The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Noûs 13 (December):3-21.
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