The cycle of action: A commentary on Garry young (2006)
Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (3):69-72 (2006)
| Abstract | As the emphasis in the title of his article indicates, Garry Young (2006) wishes to retain a role for conscious intention in the initiation of intentional acts, a proposal he contrasts with the findings and writings of Benjamin Libet, and also my own comments upon the latter (Libet et al., 1983; Spence, 1996). While Libet's classic series of experiments (and their replication by others) established that the conscious intention to act is itself preceded by predictive trains of electrical activity in the brain, Young wishes to attribute a meaningful role to intention even though it arises relatively 'late' in the stream of causation. He believes intention makes a contribution. The question here, or at least the source of perceived disagreement, seems to be: what is the nature of this contribution? Also, are we talking about a single act or the context within which it (action) occurs? | |||||||||
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Hugh McCann (1995). Intention and Motivational Strength. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.
Benjamin W. Libet (2001). Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain: Commentary on John Searle's Article (with Reply From Searle). Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):59-65.
Emiliano Lorini & Andreas Herzig (2008). A Logic of Intention and Attempt. Synthese 163 (1):45 - 77.
Stanley Klein (2002). Libet's Research on the Timing of Conscious Intention to Act: A Commentary. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):273-279.
Garry Young (2004). Bodily Knowing. Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):37 – 54.
Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (2011). Time for Consciousness: Intention and Introspection. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):369-376.
Neil Levy (2005). Libet's Impossible Demand. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):67-76.
Storrs McCall (2013). Does the Brain Lead the Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):262-265.
G. Young (2006). Preserving the Role of Conscious Decision Making in the Initiation of Intentional Action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (3):51-68.
Deborah Tollefsen (2005). Let’s Pretend!: Children and Joint Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
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